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COMMENT 
THE "SPIRIT' OF THE THREE 
STRIKES LAW: FROM THE 
ROMERO MYTH TO THE HOPEFUL 
IMPLICATIONS OF ANDRADE 
INTRODUCTION 
We watch enthralled as television news programs 
sensationalize some of the saddest moments of our reality. We 
are shocked by the violence and brutality of those who prey on 
the innocent and vulnerable. We become both enraged and 
frightened as we realize that there are people among us who 
have no regard for human life. In the wake of tragedy, we 
furiously search for answers, we seek ways to avoid suffering 
the same pain in the future and, often, we sacrifice the rights of 
many, believing that such a sacrifice is necessary and justified. 
A prime example of this reaction is California's anti-recidivist 
legislation known colloquially as "three strikes and you're out." 
This comment tracks an occurrence of this vicious cycle in 
California. Part I explains how the fear of crime as well as 
frustration with repeat offenders and the revolving door of the 
criminal justice system rose to an all-time high and contributed 
to the development of California's Three Strikes Law.1 This 
section also explores how the California Supreme Court has 
interpreted and attempted to refine the Three Strikes' Law and 
specifically how the Court addressed the issue of judicial 
discretion in sentencing under the Three Strikes Law.2 
Additionally, this section addresses the United States Supreme 
1 See infra notes ~O and accompanying text. 
2 See infra notes 41-79 and accompanying text. 
169 
1
Gross: "Spirit" Of The Three Strikes Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2002
170 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 32:2 
Court's analysis of what type of sentence violates a defendant's 
constitutional rights.3 
Part II describes how California's lower courts have 
refused to employ judicial discretion.4 Part III shows why the 
application of the law, even with court-attempted refinement, 
is constitutionally flawed and may also be ineffective as a 
measure to prevent violent crime.5 
Part IV explores the latest rulings from the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeal regarding the constitutionality of California's 
Three Strikes Law. 6 This Part also suggests a solution to 
balance the citizens' desire for a workable recidivist statute 
with the need to keep criminal punishment in California both 
fair and constitutional. 7 
1. EXTREME CASES SPUR ENACTMENT OF THE THREE STRIKES 
LAw 
On October 1, 1993 Richard Davis abducted twelve-year-
old Polly Klaas from her home at knifepoint.8 He strangled her 
and left her body at an abandoned lumber mill.9 Davis was a 
repeat offender.10 In 1975, he served a year in prison for 
burglary.11 Seven weeks after his release, the police arrested 
him for sexually assaulting a woman at a Hayward, California 
train station.12 He remained in prison for that crime until 
1982.13 Three years after his release he returned to prison for 
abducting a woman and forcing her to withdraw money from 
her bank account.14 Davis was paroled three months before 
Polly Klaas's abduction.15 An intense campaign that focused on 
3 See infra notes 80-105 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 111-153 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 154-185 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 186-248 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 249-269 and accompanying text. 
8 Ken Hoover, Polly'S Killer Guilty on All Counts / Death Penalty Possible for 
Murder, Kidnapping, S.F. CHRON., June 19, 1996, at AI. 
9 Ron Sonenshine, Polly's Dad Forms Foundation: Marc Klaas' Group to Focus on 
Crimes Against Children, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 23, 1994, at B4. 





15 Hoover, supra note 8, at AI. 
2
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss2/3
2002] "SPIRIT" OF THE THREE STRIKES LA W 171 
preventing tragedies such as the Polly Klaas murder fueled 
California's Three Strikes Initiative in 1994.16 
Similarly, a recidivist murdered Kimber Reynolds. Kimber 
was shot when she tried to prevent a thief from stealing her 
purse.17 Both of these tragedies seemed to highlight significant 
problems with California's criminal justice system. 
Recidivism,18 and a greater societal belief that those who 
commit crimes are incapable of rehabilitation, led segments of 
the community to call for tougher sentencing for violent crimes. 
Families of both Polly and Kimber spearheaded the Three 
Strikes campaign; a number of politicians joined the cause 
fearing the political demise of being labeled as soft on crime.19 
Several months before Three Strikes appeared as an 
initiative on the California ballot, politicians attempted to 
answer the community's call for change. The legislature 
enacted a habitual criminals sentencing enhancement under 
Section 667 of the California Penal Code.20 Section 667 
provides a sentencing enhancement, which lengthens the 
prison term, for anyone convicted of any felony with a prior 
violent21 or serious felony conviction. 22 The punishment for a 
16 Greg Lucas, Voters Get Their Chance at Bat On '3 Strikes You're Out' Law, S.F. 
CHRON., Oct. 15, 1994, at A2. 
17 [d. 
18 Recidivism is defined as follows: "[a] tendency to relapse into a habit of criminal 
activity or behavior." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1276 (7th ed. 1999). 
19 Harriet Chiang, Davis' Legacy: California Three Strikes Law/ Outcry Led to Long 
Sentences for Thousands of Convicts, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 6, 1996, at All. See also Erik 
G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. I, 4-6 (1998). 
(Explaining "state politicians were afraid to question the 'anti-crime fervor', which 
gripped the public following the Klaas murder [and] state legislators were 
apprehensive to openly discuss the merits of Three Strikes, and those that did and 
dared to oppose the measure were publicly derided and vilified." [d.) 
20 See generally CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1) (West, 2001), which provides in 
relevant part, "any person convicted of a serious felony who previously has been 
convicted of a serious felony in this state or any offense committed in another 
jurisdiction which includes all the elements of any serious felony, shall receive, in 
addition to the sentence imposed by the court for the present offense, a five-year 
enhancement for each such prior conviction on charges brought and tried separately. 
The terms of the present offense and each enhancement shall run consecutively."; CAL. 
PEN. CODE § 667 (c)(2)(A): "[i]f a defendant has two or more prior ["violent or serious'l 
felony convictions ... that have been pled and proved, the term of life imprisonment 
with a minimum term of the indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of: (i) 
Three times the term otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony 
conviction subsequent to the two or more prior felony convictions. (ii) Imprisonment in 
the state prison for 25 years ... " 
21 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667.5 (West 2001): "For the purpose of this section, "violent 
felony" shall mean any of the following: 
3
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Id. 
(1) Murder or voluntary manslaughter. 
(2) Mayhem. 
(3) Rape as defined in paragraph (2) or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261 or 
paragraph (1) or 
(4) of subdivision (a) of Section 262. 
(4) Sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury on the victim or another person. 
(5) Oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person. 
(6) Lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 years as defined in Section 288. 
(7) Any felony punishable by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life. 
(8) Any felony in which the defendant inflicts great bodily injury on any person 
other than an accomplice which has been charged and proved as provided for in 
Section 12022.7 or 12022.9 on or after July 1, 1977, or as specified prior to July 1, 
1977, in Sections 213, 264, and 461, or any felony in which the defendant uses a 
firearm which use has been charged and proved as provided in Section 12022.5, 
or 12022.55. 
(9) Any robbery. 
(10) Arson, in violation of subdivision (a) or (b) of Section 45l. 
(11) The offense defined in subdivision (a) of Section 289 where the act is 
accomplished against the victim's will by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear 
of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person. 
(12) Attempted murder. 
(13) A violation of Section 12308, 12309, or 12310. 
(14) Kidnapping. 
(15) Assault with the intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral copulation, 
in violation of Section 220. 
(16) Continuous sexual abuse of a child, in violation of Section 288.5. 
(17) Carjacking, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 215 . 
(18) A violation of Section 264.1. 
(19) Extortion, as defined in Section 518, which would constitute a felony 
violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code. 
(20) Threats to victims or witnesses, as defined in Section 136.1, which would 
constitute a felony violation of Section 186.22 of the Penal Code. 
(21) Any burglary of the first degree, as defined in subdivision (a) of Section 460, 
wherein it is charged and proved that another person, other than an accomplice, 
was present in the residence during the commission of the burglary. 
(22) Any violation of Section 12022.53. 
The Legislature finds and declares that these specified crimes merit special 
consideration when imposing a sentence to display society'S condemnation for 
these extraordinary crimes of violence against the person. 
22 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (a) (4) (West 2001) provides: "As used in this subdivision, 
'serious felony' means a serious felony listed in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7." CAL. 
PEN. CODE § 1192.7 (West 2001) provides: 
As used in this section, 'serious felony' means any of the following: (1) Murder or 
voluntary manslaughter; (2) mayhem; (3) rape; (4) sodomy by force, violence, 
duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and unlawful 
bodily injury on the victim or another person; (5) oral copulation by force, 
violence, duress, menace, threat of great bodily injury, or fear of immediate and 
unlawful bodily injury on the victim or another person; (6) lewd or lascivious act 
on a child under the age of 14 years; (7) any felony punishable by death or 
imprisonment in the state prison for life; (8) any felony in which the defendant 
personally inflicts great bodily injury on any person, other than an accomplice, or 
any felony in which the defendant personally uses a firearm; (9) attempted 
4
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defendant convicted of a felony is a five-year enhancement for 
each prior serious felony conviction.23 Additionally, the normal 
prison term for the crime is doubled if the defendant has any 
prior "violent or serious" felony convictions.24 A person, with 
two prior convictions for violent or serious felonies, convicted of 
any subsequent felony is charged with a third strike and the 
punishment is an indeterminate life sentence.25 Under this 
scheme, the third felony need not be violent or serious. Indeed, 
a court may be required to elevate a charge that is normally a 
misdemeanor, such as petty theft when the defendant has a 
[d. 
murder; (10) assault with intent to commit rape or robbery; (11) assault with a 
deadly weapon or instrument on a peace officer; (12) assault by a life prisoner on 
a noninmate; (13) assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate; (14) arson; (15) 
exploding a destructive device or any explosive with intent to injure; (16) 
exploding a destructive device or any explosive causing bodily injury, great bodily 
injury, or mayhem; (17) exploding a destructive device or any explosive with 
intent to murder; (18) any burglary of the first degree; (19) robbery or bank 
robbery; (20) kidnapping; (21) holding of a hostage by a person confined in a state 
prison; (22) attempt to commit a felony punishable by death or imprisonment in 
the state prison for life; (23) any felony in which the defendant personally used a 
dangerous or deadly weapon; (24) selling, furnishing, administering, giving, or 
offering to sell, furnish, administer, or give to a minor any heroin, cocaine, 
phencyclidine (PCP), or any methamphetamine-related drug, as described in 
paragraph (2) of subdivision (d) of Section 11055 of the Health and Safety Code, 
or any of the precursors of methamphetamines, as described in subparagraph (A) 
of paragraph (1) of subdivision (f) of Section 11055 or subdivision (a) of Section 
11100 of the Health and Safety Code; (25) any violation of subdivision (a) of 
Section 289 where the act is accomplished against the victim's will by force, 
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the 
victim or another person; (26) grand theft involving a firearm; (27) carjacking; 
(28) any felony offense, which would also constitute a felony violation of Section 
186.22; (29) assault with the intent to commit mayhem, rape, sodomy, or oral 
copulation, in violation of Section 220; (30) throwing acid or flammable 
substances, in violation of Section 244; (31) assault with a deadly weapon, 
firearm, machine gun, assault weapon, or semiautomatic firearm or assault on a 
peace officer or firefighter, in violation of Section 245; (32) assault with a deadly 
weapon against a public transit employee, custodial officer, or school employee, 
in violation of Sections 245.2, 245.3, or 245.5; (33) discharge of a firearm at an 
inhabited dwelling, vehicle, or aircraft, in violation of Section 246; (34) 
commission of rape or penetration by a foreign object in concert with another 
person, in violation of Section 264.1; (35) continuous sexual abuse of a child, in 
violation of Section 288.5; (36) shooting from a vehicle, in violation of subdivision 
(c) or (d) of Section 12034; (37) intimidation of victims or witnesses, in violation 
of Section 136.1; (38) terrorist threats, in violation Section 422; (39) any attempt 
to commit a crime listed in this subdivision other than an assault; (40) any 
violation of Section 12022.53; and (41) any conspiracy to commit an offense 
described in this subdivision. 
23 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(a)(1) (West 2001). 
24 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(e)(1) (West 2001). 
25 CAL. PEN. CODE § 667 (e)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) (West 2001). 
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prior petty theft conviction, to a felony and sentence the 
defendant to serve twenty-five years to life.26 
The Three Strikes Initiative, eventually codified as 
California Penal Code Section 1170.12, requires that anyone 
convicted of any felony that has previously been convicted of a 
"violent or serious felony" must be sentenced to twice the 
number of years generally proscribed for the current felony.27 
Anyone convicted of any third felony must be given an 
indeterminate sentence of twenty-five years to life. 28 The 
ballot initiative required the first two strikes be given for 
violent or serious felonies, but permitted the third strike upon 
conviction of any felony, which would send a three time 
offender to prison for a term of twenty-five years to life 
regardless of whether the final offense was neither serious nor 
violent.29 This initiative basically mirrored the ·provision 
already enacted by the legislature.3o While the enactment of a 
26 See 1 WITKIN CRIM. LAw, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMES § 72 (e) (3) (3rd ed. 2000) 
(describing how certain crimes such as petty theft with a prior are "wobblers" and are 
technically felonies, but may be reduced to misdemeanors). 
27 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12 (West 2001). 
28 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12(c)(2)(A) (West 2001) providing in relevant part, "[i]f a 
defendant has two or more prior [violent or serious] felony convictions ... the term for 
the current felony conviction shall be an indeterminate term oflife imprisonment ... " 
29 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.12(a) (West 2001), which provides: "Notwithstanding 
any other provision of law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been 
pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions, as defined 
in subdivision (b), the court shall adhere to each of the following .... " Section 1170.12 
(b) in relevant part provides, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law and for the 
purposes of this section, a prior conviction of a felony shall be defined as: (1) Any 
offense dermed in subdivision (c) of section 667.5 as a violent felony or any offense 
defined in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state .... " Section 
1170.12 (c) in relevant part provides: 
[d. 
For purposes of this section, and in addition to any other enhancements or 
punishment provisions which may apply, the following shall apply where a 
defendant has a prior felony conviction: (1) If a defendant has one prior felony 
conviction that has been pled and proved, the determinate term or minimum 
term for an indeterminate term shall be twice the term otherwise provided as 
punishment for the current felony conviction. (2)(A) If a defendant has two or 
more felony convictions, as defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) that have 
been pled and proved, the term for the current felony conviction shall be an 
indeterminate sentence calculated as the greater of (i) three times the term 
otherwise provided as punishment for each current felony conviction subsequent 
to the two or more prior felony convictions, or (ii) twenty· five years or (iii) the 
term determined by the Court pursuant to section 1170 for the underlying 
conviction, including any enhancement applicable under Chapter 4.5 
(commencing with Section 1170 of Title 7 of Part 2, or any period prescribed by 
Section 190 or 3406 .... 
30 Erik G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 
6
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss2/3
2002] "SPIRIT" OF THE THREE STRIKES LA W 175 
nearly identical initiative may seem superfluous, some believed 
that placing the initiative on the ballot would send a clear and 
strong message to the legislature that the community was 
serious about creating a tougher criminal justice system.31 
Additionally, the legislature may only change initiatives by a 
two-thirds majority vote and thus, proponents of Three Strikes 
used the initiative to safeguard the Three Strikes Law from the 
possibility of future legislative changes.32 
Before the 1994 election in which Three Strikes was placed 
on the ballot, members of Polly's family including her 
grandfather Joe Klaas, explained that he and many of the Polly 
Klaas Foundation volunteers had collected signatures for the 
bill without having read it.33 Joe Klaas spoke at Golden Gate 
University as a representative of the Polly Klaas foundation to 
inform people that the law as written, unfairly punishes 
residential burglary as harshly as assault, rape or severely 
violent crimes, as each of these offenses result in life sentences 
after three convictions.34 
In fact, Polly's father, Marc Klaas, removed his name from 
support of the 1994 ballot initiative because he believed that 
only convictions of violent or serious felonies should count as 
strikes. 35 The Klaas family immediately pulled its support 
from the campaign and began an anti-initiative campaign in 
the hopes of educating Californians regarding the actual 
consequences of the initiative.36 Instead, they lent their 
support to a revised version of the recidivist statute named the 
Polly Klaas Memorial Bill.37 Unfortunately, the Three Strikes 
initiative had already garnered strong support from the 
public. 38 The California Correctional Peace Officers 
Association, a strong prison guard union, contributed $100,000 
to place the initiative on the 1994 ballot.39 As a result, the 
9 (1998). 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 9·10. 
33 Stephen Schwartz, Joe Klaas Regrets Backing '3 Strikes' Measure, S.F. CHRON., 
Apr. 20, 1994, at A17. 
34 Id. 
35 Robert B. Gunnison, State Tops Nation in Imprisonment Rate: Three Strikes 
Opponents Cite Steep Costs, S.F. CHRON., July 15, 1994, at A20. 
36 Sonenshine, supra note 9, at B4. 
37 Schwartz, supra note 33, at A17. 
38 Chiang, supra note 19, at AI. 
39 Lucas, supra note16, at A2. 
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Three Strikes Initiative easily passed in the 1994 election with 
seventy-two percent approval from California voters.40 
After the Three Strikes Law was enacted, California courts 
began to confront many issues that were not explicitly 
addressed in the statute. One of those issues was whether 
judicial discretion in sentencing would survive the required 
sentencing enhancement and guidelines of the Three Strikes 
Law.41 
A. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AS DEFINED BY ROMERO AND 
WILLIAMS 
1. The Romero Decision 
In 1996, the California Supreme Court confronted the 
Three Strikes controversy, deciding whether a trial court may 
strike a prior felony conviction under certain circumstances to 
avoid overly harsh sentences. Jesus Romero was charged with 
possession of .13 grams of cocaine base in 1994.42 Romero was 
previously convicted of first and second-degree burglary, 
attempted burglary and possession of a controlled substance 
between the years of 1980 and 1993.43 At trial, the court 
permitted Romero to enter a guilty plea in exchange for 
striking his prior felony convictions. 44 Thus, the court 
sentenced him to six years in prison rather than twenty-five 
years to life. 45 
The court calculated Romero's six-year sentence by 
imposing the greatest term permitted for possession and by 
adding "three consecutive one-year enhancements for [the] 
prior felony convictions."46 The district attorney petitioned for 
a writ of mandate and the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
trial court had no power in a Three Strikes case to vacate a 
40 Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL'y REV. 23, 24 (Winter 1999). 
41 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 1170.2(d)(2) (West 2001), referring to the prosecutor's 
power to "dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction allegation in the furtherance of 
justice," but making no mention of the same power in the judiciary. 
42 People v. Romero, 13 Cal 4th 497, 506 (1996). 
43 Id. 
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defendant's prior strikes on its own motion.47 Romero appealed 
his case to the California Supreme Court.48 
California Supreme Court Justice Werdegar's majority 
opinion held that nothing in the Three Strikes Law prohibits a 
trial judge from employing the judicial discretion granted to 
them under California Penal Code Section 1385(a).49 Section 
1385(a) permits a judge to "either of his or her own motion or 
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in 
furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed."50 The 
legislative version of the Three Strikes Law, California Penal 
Code Section 667, specifically refers to dismissal under Section 
1385(a) and does not explicitly overrule the judicial discretion 
created therein. 51 
The Romero Court thus found that it would be 
unconstitutional to permit the prosecutor to dismiss strikes, 
but prohibit the court from doing so, unless the legislature had 
explicitly stripped the court of its discretionary power. 52 
Although Section 1385(a) on its face does not grant the court 
discretionary power in enhancement cases under Section 667, 
the Three Strikes Law refers to such discretion and thus, the 
court reasoned, the legislative intent was not to eliminate it.53 
In doing so, the Court held that "although the legislature may 
withdraw the statutory power to dismiss in furtherance of 
justice, we conclude it has not done so in the Three Strikes 
Law."54 
Mter the Romero decision was handed down, California's 
legal and political communities voiced both relief and concern. 
While district attorneys feared that the Three Strikes Law 
would no longer be applied with as much fervor, public 
47 1d. 
48 1d. 
49 1d. at 529·30. 
50 CAL. PEN. CODE § 1385(a) (West 2001). 
61 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 667(1)(2) (West 2001), which provides: 
1d. 
[t]he prosecuting attorney may move to dismiss or strike a prior felony conviction 
allegation in the furtherance of justice pursuant to Section 1385, or if there is 
insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction. If upon the satisfaction 
of the court there is insufficient evidence to prove the prior felony conviction, the 
court mat dismiss or strike the allegation. 
62 Romero, 13 Cal 4th at 512, 529·30. 
63 1d. at 519·20. 
64 1d. at 504. 
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defenders and others concerned about the draconian effects of 
the law celebrated the decision as a step in the right 
direction. 55 
2. The Williams Decision 
Although Romero authorized a certain degree of power to 
judges to avoid unnecessarily harsh sentences, this power was 
severely limited by the California Supreme Court two years 
later. 56 Eugene Williams was convicted of driving under the 
influence of phencyclidine (PCP) in 1995.57 This crime is 
known as a "wobbler," which means that it may be charged as a 
misdemeanor or a felony depending on whether the defendant 
has prior convictions of the same offense. 58 The prosecutor 
chose to charge Williams with a felony and additionally alleged 
that Williams had previously been convicted of three "violent or 
serious" felonies, including rape and two convictions for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm. 59 
Williams requested that the superior court either declare 
his current offense a misdemeanor or strike one of his previous 
"violent or serious" felonies pursuant to California Penal Code 
Section 1385(a).60 The trial court ruled that it would not 
categorize his current offense as a misdemeanor, but would 
consider striking a prior felony conviction so as to treat 
Williams as a two strike case, rather than a three strike case.61 
The court explained that this action was proper because 
Williams' prior serious and violent felonies occurred thirteen 
years ago, when he was twenty years old, and because Williams 
had not committed any crimes involving violence since then.62 
Thereafter, Williams changed his plea to guilty, the superior 
court vacated the prior strike for attempted robbery, and 
sentenced him to nine years in prison.63 
55 Chiang, supra note 19, at AI. 
56 People v. Williams, 17 Cal. 4th 148 (1998). 
57 Id. at 152. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 155. 
61 Williams, 17 Cal 4th at 155·56. 
62 Id. at 156. 
63 Id. at 156·57. 
10
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On appeal, the superior court's decision to vacate one of 
Williams's strikes was reviewed for abuse of discretion.64 The 
Court of Appeal held that the superior court had indeed abused 
its discretion, "in light of Williams's 'extraordinary record of 
prior criminality."'65 The Court of Appeal further ordered the 
superior court to sentence Williams under Three Strikes to a 
term of twenty-eight years-to-life.66 
Williams petitioned the California Supreme Court and was 
granted review.67 The California Supreme Court attempted to 
delineate the boundaries of Romero by explicating how and 
when a court should employ judicial discretion to vacate a prior 
strike.68 First, the Court attempted to define the broad 
concepts expressed in Section 1385(a).69 It explained that there 
is no statutory definition of the phrase "in the furtherance of 
justice" and thus its interpretation must be guided by 
precedent case law.70 Accordingly, a court must balance "the 
constitutional rights of the defendant, and the interests of 
society represented by the People, in determining whether there 
should be dismissal."71 
The Court decided that the definition of "justice" must be 
found within the scheme of the Three Strikes Law.72 
Therefore, a court's determination to vacate a prior strike: 
must consider whether, in light of the nature and 
circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or 
violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his 
background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be 
deemed outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and 
hence should be treated as though he had not previously been 
convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. 73 
64 [d. at 157. 
65 [d. 
66 Williams, 17 Cal 4th at 158. 
67 [d. 
66 [d. at 158-65. 
69 [d. at 159. 
70 [d. 
71 Williams, 17 Cal. 4th at 159. 
72 [d. at 160. 
73 [d. at 161. 
11
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Additionally, a court that decides a defendant is not within 
the spirit of the Three Strikes Law must record its reasons for 
such a finding. 74 
Applying this standard to Williams, the Court found 
nothing encouraging in his ''background, character and 
prospects."75 The Court emphasized that Williams had four 
convictions for driving under the influence and had been 
consistently involved in other criminal activity.76 Additionally, 
his convictions between age twenty and thirty-two involved not 
only driving under the influence and being a felon in possession 
of a firearm, but also a misdemeanor charge of spousal 
battery.77 The Court concluded, "[i]n view of the foregoing, the 
superior court's order fell outside the bounds of reason under 
the applicable law and the relevant facts."78 
3. The Implications of Williams and Romero 
Williams instructed California judges that while Romero 
discretion exists, it is not limitless. By addressing amorphous 
concepts such as "in the furtherance of justice," the California 
Supreme Court seemingly hoped to reign in judges from 
limitlessly exercising sentencing discretion. Williams's 
criminal history was, however, arguably excessive as it 
included violent crimes and crimes involving firearms. Also, 
the "wobbler" that was charged as a felony, driving while 
intoxicated, is one which society has a great interest in 
deterring.79 Therefore, questions still remained after Williams. 
For example, is a court acting in a legislative capacity 
when it attempts to distinguish between those defendants who 
fall within the spirit of Three Strikes and those that are 
deserving of another chance? And how will judges defme the 
"spirit" of Three Strikes when they are confronted with 
defendants who do not clearly fit within either of those 
categories? One of the great concerns that remained after 
74 [d .. 
7S [d. at 163. 
76 Williams, 17 Cal. 4th at 163. 
77 [d. 
78 [d. at 164. 
79 [d. at 153. Although Williams was arrested before an accident occurred, he was 
so incapacitated by phencyclidine (PCP) that the officer had to ask him for his license 
eight times and each time Williams responded, "[b]ow are you doing sir?" [d .. 
12
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Romero and Williams was whether judicial discretion would be 
applied to avoid extremely long sentences that many believed 
violated the defendants' constitutional rights. 
B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION OF DISPROPORTIONATE 
SENTENCES AS A CHALLENGE TO "THREE STRIKES" 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."so 
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment as a bar to 
sentences that are disproportionate to a defendant's 
conviction.81 
In Solem u. Helm, the defendant was convicted of passing a 
bad $100 check.82 He had previously been convicted six times 
for nonviolent felonies. 83 None of Helm's previous convictions 
were crimes against persons and intoxication was a 
contributing factor in each offense.84 The felonies included 
obtaining money under false pretenses, third degree burglary, 
and driving while intoxicated.85 Although the typical 
punishment for passing a bad check was five years in prison 
and a $5,000 fine, Helm was sentenced under South Dakota's 
recidivist statute to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.86 To no avail, Helm argued to the South Dakota 
Supreme Court that the sentence constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment and thus violated his Eighth Amendment 
rights.87 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
consider Helm's Eighth Amendment claim.88 The Supreme 
Court found that the Eighth Amendment requires that a 
defendant's sentence be proportionate to the crime 
80 u.s. CONST. amend. VIII § 1. 
81 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). 
82 [d. at 281. 
83 [d. at 279. 
84 [d. at 280. 
85 [d. at 279-80. 
88 Solem, 463 U.S. at 281-83. 
87 [d. at 283. 
88 [d. at 284. 
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committed.89 The Court agreed that a certain amount of 
deference must be shown to a state legislature's decisions 
regarding punishment, but such deference does not concede 
that any "penalty is per se constitutional."90 The Court 
concluded "[i]n sum, a court's proportionality analysis under 
the Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria, 
including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the 
penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the 
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for 
commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions."91 
In Helm's case, the Supreme Court identified his conviction 
as "one of the most passive felonies a person could commit."92 
While the Supreme Court recognized that Helm was punished 
more severely because of his recidivist status, it also demanded 
that such a status be carefully analyzed.93 The Court 
emphasized that none of Helm's past offenses involved violence 
against people.94 The Supreme Court concluded that Helm 
received a harsher sentence for his nonviolent crime than most 
offenders receive for violent crimes against persons, such as 
rape.95 The Court also emphasized that Helm received a 
tougher sentence under South Dakota's recidivist statute than 
he would have received in any other state, with one possible 
exception.96 The Supreme Court concluded that Helm's 
"sentence is significantly disproportionate to his crime and is 
therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment."97 
Members of the Supreme Court slightly revised the Solem 
analysis in Harmelin v. Michigan.98 In Harmelin, the 
defendant was convicted of cocaine possession and sentenced to 
life without the possibility of parole.99 The Supreme Court 
granted review of Harmelin's claims.10o The Supreme Court 
affirmed his sentence, but the Justices disagreed about how the 
89 [d. 
90 ld. at 290. 
91 Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. 
92 [d. at 296 (quoting State v. Helm, 287 N.W. 2d 497, 501 (S.D. 1980». 
93 Solem, 463 U.S. at 297-97. 
94 [d. at 297. 
96 ld. at 298. 
96 [d. at 299-300. 
97 [d. at 303. 
98 501 U.S. 957 (1991). 
99 [d. at 961. 
100 ld. 
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Court should apply the Eighth Amendment proportionality 
analysis. 101 Seven Justices held that the Eighth Amendment 
requires that a defendant's sentence be proportionate to the 
crime. 102 Justice White's opinion, joined by three other 
Justices, argued that the Court should continue to apply the 
Solem analysis.103 Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter 
opined that the court should adopt a modified test where the 
second and third objective Solem factors would only be reached 
in cases where an initial comparison of the punishment and the 
crime leads one to believe that the sentence is indeed grossly 
disproportionate.104 Since Harmelin, courts have variously 
employed the Solem analysis as \\Tell as Justice Kennedy's 
modified Solem test.105 
The proportionality analysis has been applied to habitual 
offender. statutes, such as California's Three Strikes Law.106 
Recidivist statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional solely 
because they provide an increased punishment for certain 
crimes.107 It is possible, however, to prove a constitutional 
violation on a case-by-case basis by showing that the sentence 
is disproportionate to the present offense, or that the previous 
offenses are nonviolent. lOS 
The Ninth Circuit agrees that "the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits punishments that are soundly rejected by the 
"'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.''' 109 Thus, "a criminal sentence is 
unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment if it is 'extreme 
and grossly disproportionate'" to the crime committed. no 
Opponents of Three Strikes argued that the law clearly 
violated the Eighth Amendment proportionality requirement. 
Still, convictions under Three Strikes and the length of 
defendants' sentences continued to increase. California courts 
continued to uphold exceedingly long sentences for lesser 
101 [d. at 996. 
102 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 954 (1998). 
103 Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1009·1027 . 
104 [d. at 996·1009 
105 21A AM. JUR. 2d Criminal Law § 954 (1998). 
106 39 AM. JUR. 2d Habitual Criminals and Subsequent Offenders § 14 (1998). 
107 [d. 
108 [d. 
109 Belgrade v. State of Mont., 123 F.3d 1210, 1215 (9th Cir. 1997) quoting Harris v. 
Wright, 93 F.3d 581, 583 (9th Cir.1996). 
110 [d. 
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crimes using the "spirit" of Three Strikes and the punishment 
of recidivism as justification. 
II. How CALIFORNIA COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THREE 
STRIKES SINCE ROMERO AND SOLEM 
Mter Romero and Williams were decided, California courts 
continued to struggle with the notion of judicial discretion and 
the constitutionality of the Three Strikes Law. In 1995, Kevin 
Weber, a homeless alcoholic, was sentenced under California's 
Three Strikes Law to 25 years to life for stealing four cookies 
from a restaurant.l11 He appealed the sentence on the ground 
that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment.1l2 By the 
time Weber's case was on appeal, the California Supreme Court 
decided in Romero that judges have a certain amount of 
discretion to strike a previous felony conviction in order to 
avoid an overly harsh sentence and thereby avoid any Eighth 
Amendment claim. 
In Weber's case, however, the California Court of Appeal 
declined to use its Romero discretion and affirmed the trial 
court's sentence.1l3 The court emphasized Weber's criminal 
history including previous convictions for burglary, assault 
with a firearm and receiving stolen goods.1l4 Yet the court 
seemed to unfairly use his recidivist status to justify a harsh 
sentence and to prophesize that the gravity of the harm of 
Weber's current offense would have been worse had Weber not 
been apprehended. In a unanimous decision, Justice Sills 
wrote, "[a] safecracker who cracks an empty safe is nonetheless 
a safecracker."115 The court believed that Weber would have 
stolen more than four cookies had the restaurant's alarm not 
sounded.1l6 
In another case, the Court of Appeal reversed a lower 
court's decision to strike Ralph Aguilar Carrion's previous 
felony and sentence him to eight years rather than the 
111 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, Court Upholds 3-Strikes Term for Cookie Thief 





116 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, CQurt Upholds 3-Strikes Term for Cookie Thief 
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at B7. 
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mandatory twenty-five to life that he would have received 
under the Three Strikes Law. ll7 The Court opined that the 
trial court had abused its discretion and did not give 
"appropriate weight to Carrion's record of recidivism."118 
Carrion's prior convictions included second-degree burglary as 
a teenager, burglary as an adult in 1989, and possession of 
fifteen dollars worth of heroin in 1998.119 
The trial court found that Carrion's problem was severe 
drug addiction and described his third offense as nonviolent. 12o 
Thus, the court decided that a life sentence was too extreme in 
this case.121 The Court of Appeal, however, overruled the trial 
court decision, reasoning that "Carrion is clearly within the 
spirit of the three-strikes law ... there is no evidence that he 
will modify his conduct in the future."122 
Recently the Court of Appeal again upheld the trial court's 
refusal to use its discretion to prevent a defendant from facing 
a life sentence for petty theft.123 In People v. Murphy, the 
defendant was found guilty of petty theft with three prior 
convictions for first-degree burglary. 124 The trial court 
sentenced Murphy to prison for twenty-five years to life.125 
Murphy appealed and argued that his sentence constituted 
cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.126 The appellate court remanded the case back to 
the trial court to decide whether to exercise its judicial 
discretion and strike a previous felony conviction.127 
On remand, Murphy argued that imposing a life sentence 
for petty theft would constitute cruel and unusual punishment 





121 Stuart Pfeifer & Jack Leonard, Court Upholds 3·Strikes Term for Cookie Thief 
Ruling, L.A. TIMES, June 19, 2001, at B7. 
122 [d. Emphasis added. 
123 People v. Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th 392 (2001). 
124 [d. at 393. 
125 [d. 
126 [d. at 393·94. 
127 [d. at 394 .. 
128 Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394. 
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court refused to recognize either of his arguments.129 Murphy 
appealed again.130 
The Court of Appeal addressed three issues: (1) whether 
the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to erase one of 
Murphy's previous strikes, (2) whether Murphy's sentence 
constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (3) whether 
Murphy was precluded from challenging his sentence in any 
respect other than his original argument due to the nature of 
the appellate court's limited remand.l31 The court held that, as 
it had previously affirmed the sentence and only remanded to 
allow the trial court to determine whether or not it wanted to 
exercise Romero discretion, I Murphy was precluded from 
arguing that the elevation of petty theft to a felony to invoke 
the Three Strikes Law violated constitutional due process and 
double jeopardy principles.132 In addition, the Murphy court 
concluded that, "the [trial] court did not abuse its discretion 
under Romero by refusing to vacate the strike findings, and 
that Murphy's sentence is not cruel or unusual." 133 
Unfortunately, due to the nature of the limited remand, the 
court did not offer any justification for its belief that Murphy's 
sentence complied with the Eighth Amendment. 
In another case involving Romero discretion, Bradford 
Strong was charged with selling $10 worth of a substance that 
he led an undercover officer to believe was cocaine.134 Tests 
later revealed that the rock-like substance did not contain any 
illicit narcotics.135 At the preliminary hearing the district 
attorney moved to amend the complaint and add a strike.136 In 




132 Id. at 396. 
133 Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394. (The Court did not discuss either of these 
issues and instead analyzed why Murphy was prohibited from raising new arguments 
on appeal regarding his sentence, as the appellate court had not reversed it. Therefore, 
it is impossibie to evaluate why the court did not believe that the trial court abused its 
discretion or that 25 years to life in prison does not constitute cruel or unusual 
punishment.) 
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weapon causing great bodily injury.137 The trial court denied 
the motion to amend as "unreasonable."138 
Instead, the judge informed Strong that "if he wished to 
plead guilty to the current offense and admit the prior 
conviction, the court would sentence him to the lower term of 
the offense and dismiss the strike."139 The district attorney 
argued that Strong had a long criminal history and attempted 
to convince the court that Strong's current offense posed a 
threat of violence because, "(p]eople get assaulted, stabbed, and 
even killed for selling bunk when prospective buyers discover 
they have been cheated."140 
The trial court judge rejected the district attorney's 
argument, dismissed Strong's strike, denied him parole 
because of his long record and current narcotics charge and 
sentenced him to 16 months in prison.141 The judge explained 
that the strike should be dismissed for numerous reasons. 
First, the current offense was "relatively non-threatening" 
because Strong was not actually selling a narcotic substance.142 
Also, Strong had statistically become a reduced risk to society 
because of his middle age.143 In addition, Strong's record, was 
"devoid of violence or threat of violence except for the strike, 
which did not involve a firearm" and had no prior conviction for 
use or possession of a firearm. 144 Finally, Strong's record only 
amounted to a number of "petty acquisitive offenses and 
substance abuse [and sentencing him under the three strikes 
law] ... would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Three 
Strikes law as explicated by People v. Williams."145 
The Court of Appeal, however, found that none of the trial 
court's reasons for vacating Strong's prior strike reasonably 
constituted extraordinary circumstances that would remove 
him from within the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.146 In 
doing so, the Court of Appeal declared that, "[a]lthough the 
137 [d. 
138 [d. 
139 Strong, 87 Cal App 4th at 333. 




144 Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 334. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 331-32. 
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trial court reasoned that defendant's violent strike was 'out of 
character,' a defendant who falls squarely within the law's 
letter does not take himself outside its spirit by the additional 
commission of a virtually uninterrupted series of nonviolent 
felonies and misdemeanors over a lengthy period."147 
The appellate court reasoned that one discerns the spirit of 
the Three Strikes Law by analyzing the statutory intent.148 
The court explained that "the Three Strikes Law expressly 
declares that its purpose is 'to ensure longer prison sentences 
and greater punishment for those who commit a felony and 
have been previously convicted of serious and/or violent 
offenses.' "149 
The court's interpretation, however, is founded on 
California cases where the spirit of Three Strikes was applied 
to the "revolving door defendant."15o Absent is a discussion of 
the law's goal of preventing certain violent or serious felonies. 
Instead the court claimed that a mere history of multiple 
offenses, whether violent or not, validates the application of the 
Three Strikes Law. 151 
This line of post-Romero cases indicates that while Romero 
is still considered good law in California, the discretion it 
affords to the judiciary is viewed in the narrowest light.152 The 
holdings represent how limited judicial discretion remains in 
Three Strikes cases.153 California courts do not seem to view 
life sentences as extreme for minor offenses, such as petty 
theft, when those offenses are combined with a long criminal 
history regardless of whether this history is based on poverty 
or drug addiction. 
147 [d. at 331. 
148 [d. at 336-37. 
149 Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 337. (citing § 667, subdivision (b); Ballot Pamphlet, 
text of Proposition 184, General Election at 64 (Nov. 8, 1994). 
150 Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 338. 
161 [d. 
162 See Strong, 87 Cal. App. 4th at 338; Murphy, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 394. 
163 The"Three Strikes and You're Out" Law: An Update, Legislative Analyst's Office, 
1997. According to a 1997 study conducted by the Legislative Analyst's Office, there 
was little change in the numbers of second and third strike offenders imprisoned 
between 1995 and 1997, the year before and after Romero, respectively. 
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III. WHY THE THREE STRIKES LAw IN CALIFORNIA VIOLATES 
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND IS AN INADEQUATE VIOLENT 
CRIME PREVENTATIVE 
A. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HINTS AT THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS OF THREE STRIKES 
In 1999, the United States Supreme Court voiced concerns 
over the application of the "third strike" in California Three 
Strikes cases. In Riggs v. California, a homeless man stole a 
bottle of vitamins from a supermarket. 154 Although the 
California Court of Appeal described the offense as "a petty 
theft motivated by homelessness and hunger," it held that the 
Three Strikes Law authorized the court to treat the offense as 
a felony and sentence Riggs to a minimum of twenty-five years 
to life imprisonment.155 Even though the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari to Riggs' Eighth Amendment 
claim that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to his 
crime, Justice Stevens wrote "[t]his question is obviously 
substantial, particularly since California appears to be the only 
state in which a misdemeanor could receive such a severe 
sentence."156 
Further, "while this court has traditionally accorded to 
state legislatures considerable (but not unlimited) deference to 
determine the length of sentences 'for crimes concededly 
classified and classifiable as felonies,'petty theft does not 
appear to fall into that category."157 Justice Stevens does 
admit that a recidivist statute, which punishes a defendant 
more heavily for his or her recidivism, is justified, but 
distinguishes this from a statute that in effect includes 
additional punishment for earlier crimes.15S The United States 
Supreme Court declined to grant certiorari because, "neither 
the California Supreme Court nor any federal tribunal has yet 
addressed the question."159 
154 525 u.s. 1114 (1999). 
156 [d. 
156 [d. 
167 Riggs, 525 u.S. at 1114, citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (1980). 
158 Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 
169 [d. (Justice Stevens's opinion denying certiorari was joined by Justices Souter 
and Ginsburg.) 
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Justice Breyer's dissent on the other hand, believed the 
issue of applying the Three Strikes Law to a petty offense 
raised serious questions and thus argued the issue was ripe. l60 
Therefore, while Riggs is clearly not precedent, at the very 
least it is an indication that the United States Supreme Court 
seriously questions the constitutionality of California's Three 
Strikes Law. 
In 2001, the United States Supreme Court again grappled 
with the Three Strikes Law.161 In Durden v. California, the 
defendant appealed his sentence to the state court of appeal 
and was denied review.162 The United States Supreme Court 
also denied certiorari.163 In this case, however, both Justices 
Souter and Breyer would have granted certiorari.164 Justice 
Souter explained that while in Riggs he had wished to wait and 
see the outcome of state decisions on the issue, he believed that 
this reason no longer justified denying certiorari. 165 He 
expressed concern that, "two years after Riggs, the Supreme 
Court of California has not taken up the issue."166 More 
importantly, "some 319 California prisoners are now serving 
sentences of twenty-five years to life for what would otherwise 
be misdemeanor theft under the California scheme."167 Justice 
Souter concluded that, "[o]n these facts, I would wait no 
longer. The issue is serious, the state courts have had 
adequate opportunity to consider it, and the stakes are 
substantial."168 Therefore, though continuing to deny certiorari 
to review Eighth Amendment claims, some members of the 
United States Supreme Court have clearly expressed concern 
about the application of Three Strikes in California. 
While some argue that the "Three Strikes [Law] is a much 
more defensible law after Romero's construction,"169 it is 
nevertheless difficult to see why in light of the cases that 
160 Riggs, 525 U.S. at 1114. 





166 Durden, 531 U.S. 1184. 
167 [d. 
168 [d. 
169 Brian P. Janiskee & Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An 
Analysis of the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law 39 DUQ. L. REV. 43, 65 
(2000). 
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followed. If judges are refusing to employ their discretion, even 
in the most extreme cases like Weber's, while others are being 
overturned for abuse of discretion, it is not clear that Romero 
discretion truly exists. Romero remains an elusive power 
seldom exercised and the "spirit" of Three Strikes remains an 
expansive justification for longer prison terms given to 
nonviolent offenders. 
B. THREE STRIKES LAw: AN INEFFECTIVE DETERRENT 
In 1997, the Department of Justice conducted a study 
comparing California's Three Strikes Law to the State of 
Washington's recidivist statute. The study indicated that while 
the majority of offenders in California were sentenced under 
the Three Strikes Law for nonviolent crimes, in Washington, 
all but o~ person was sentenced under its recidivist statute for 
crimes against persons.170 
Another study of the Three Strikes Law published by the 
Stanford Law and Policy Review indicates that the California 
law as written is ineffective and overbroad. l7l Although 
proponents of recidivist statutes claim that the institution of 
harsher sentencing has resulted in lowering crime rates, there 
has been a steady decline in crime for the past decade including 
the years before the Three Strikes Law was enacted. 172 
Additionally, in comparing states with recidivist statutes and 
those without any Three Strikes legislation there is no 
discernable difference between the declining crime rates.173 
The Stanford study also argues that since Three Strikes is 
partially justified as a deterrent, it would be proven successful 
only if crime rates were dropping in groups targeted by the 
Three Strikes Law.174 For example, Three Strikes was enacted 
to deter career criminals from committing any further criminal 
activity. 175 The age group most likely targeted by such a 
statute would be those over thirty as an older offender is more 
170 Jeremy Travis, Three Strikes and You're Out: A Review of State Legislation, 
NAT'L INST. OF JUST., 3 (1997) 
171 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three 
Strikes" and You're Out Law, 11 STAN. L. & POL'y REV. 65 (2000). 
172 Id. at 65, 66. 
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likely to have previous felony offenses.176 Indeed "California 
crime statistics reveal that felony offenders in their 30s and 
40s are eight and ten times, respectively, more likely to be 
sentenced under Three Strikes than felons in their early 
20S."177 Therefore, if Three Strikes Law is an effective 
deterrent, one would expect to see the greatest decline in crime 
in the above thirty age group. 178 However, "in the categories of 
violent and property index offenses, offenders over age 30 
accounted for almost 84 percent of California's arrest growth 
over the last two decades."179 Thus, it seems that Three Strikes 
is not effectively deterring those over age thirty from 
committing crimes. 
The Stanford study further argues that the Three Strikes 
Law is applied differently in the various counties of 
California. ISO Arguably, the counties that apply the Three 
Strikes Law more leniently should see the lowest dQcrease in 
felony crimes. On the contrary, "San Francisco County, which 
had the lowest rate of Three Strikes commitments, experienced 
a 35 percent decline in homicides, a 33 percent decline in all 
violent crimes, and a 28 percent decline in all index crimes."181 
In comparison, counties that used the legislation more 
extensively did not see such a dramatic drop in crime rates.182 
Finally, the study indicates that an analysis of what 
felonies constitute offenders' third and fmal strike show that 
only three percent involve murder and only thirty-six percent 
involve other types of violent offenses.183 As a result the vast 
majority of third strikes are given for nonviolent offenses, such 
as property crimes and drug offenses and "[m]any of the Third 
Strikes appear to be misdemeanors, which, under probation 
guidelines, are bumped up to felonies."184 
These studies indicate that California's Three Strikes Law 
is ineffective. Three Strikes is unsuccessful because there is no 
176 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's "Three 




180 [d. at 65, 67. 
181 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, Striking Out: The Failure of California's ''Three 
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proof that the law is a deterrent. Further, statistics show that 
the Three Strikes Law is not targeting dangerous and violent 
career criminals as it was created to do. Instead, non-violent 
offenders have been incarcerated at alarming rates. lS5 
IV. RECONCILING THE SPIRIT OF THE THREE STRIKES LAw WITH 
THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION 
A. A NEW INTERPRETATION BRINGS NEW HOPE 
On November 2, 2001, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
held for the first time that sentencing a defendant under Three 
Strikes to twenty-five years to life, where the triggering offense 
is a misdemeanor petty theft, may violate the Eighth 
Amendment to the constitution. ls6 While the court refused to 
hold that Three Strikes is generally unconstitutional, it did 
find that the law violated Leandro Andrade's rights because his 
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime.l87 
The Ninth Circuit, referring to the pre-sentencing report, 
explained that Andrade is a long-time drug addict who has 
been convicted of five felonies and two misdemeanors, all of 
which were nonviolent. lss In November of 1995, Andrade was 
arrested twice for shoplifting videos from Kmart, which totaled 
$153.94 in value. lS9 Both of these offenses were clearly 
nonviolent and constituted a petty theft, which is generally 
charged as a misdemeanor.l9o Since Andrade had a previous 
theft-related conviction, the current petty thefts were counted 
as "wobblers."l9l A wobbler, such as petty theft with a prior 
1811 See Legislative Analyst's Office Study, The "Three Strikes and You're Out" Law: 
An Update, 1997. According to a 1997 study conducted by the Legislative Analyst's 
Office, less than one quarter of second strike offenders were imprisoned for a violent or 
serious offense. In fact, the most common offenses designated as second strikes were 
possession of a controlled substance, petty theft with a prior petty theft conviction and 
second·degree burglary. 
188 Andrade v. Att'y Gen. of California, 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001). 
187 Id. at 747. 
188 Id. at 748. (Andrade's convictions include: a misdemeanor theft in 1982; a plea of 
guilty to a consolidated preceding of three counts of residential burglary in 1983; 
transportation of marijuana in 1988; petty theft in 1990 and later the same year 
transportation of marijuana; and parole violation for escape from federal prison in 
1991.) 
189 Id. at 749. 
100 Id. 
191 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 749. 
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petty theft, may be charged as a misdemeanor or a felony 
under the prosecutor's discretion.192 The prosecutor in this 
case chose to count the two petty thefts with a prior as 
felonies. 193 Andrade's burglary convictions constituted his first 
two strikes and the current petty thefts with a prior counted as 
his third and fourth strike.194 Andrade was found guilty on all 
counts and sentenced to twenty-five years to life for each 
current petty theft.195 The Ninth Circuit calculated that under 
the Three Strikes Law, Andrade would be required to serve the 
two twenty-five year sentences consecutively and thus, he 
would not be eligible for parole until 2046 when he reached the 
age of eighty-seven years old.196 
Andrade appealed his case through the state system to the 
California Supreme Court, which denied his petition for 
review.197 Thereafter, Andrade filed a writ of habeas corpus in 
a federal district court claiming constitutional violations, 
including an argument that the sentence violated his Eighth 
Amendment rights, which the district court quickly 
dismissed.198 The Ninth Circuit, however, granted a hearing 
regarding the Eighth Amendment claim.199 
In its analysis of Andrade's claim, the court recounted the 
case law surrounding disproportionate sentencing.2°O In 
conclusion of its review of the Solem-Harmelin line of cases, the 
court applied the revised three-factor test of Harmelin to 
Andrade.201 Here, the court found that an initial comparison of 
Andrade's crime and sentence led to an "inference of gross 
disproportionality."202 Considering Andrade's age, life 
expectancy and the fact that Three Strikes requires sentences 
to run consecutively and does not give good time credit, the 
court found that his sentence was functionally equivalent to life 









200 [d. at 753-58. 
201 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 758. 
202 [d. 
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sentence only after capital punishment.203 This extreme 
punishment was compared to his conviction of petty theft, 
which the court found did not cause grave harm to society and 
was generally charged as a misdemeanor.204 Finding that his 
sentence was grossly disproportionate to his crime and was not 
dissipated by his prior criminal record, which included only 
nonviolent crimes, the court went on to examine the other 
objective factors first set out in Solem.205 
First, the court performed an intrajurisdictional 
comparison of Andrade's sentence to other defendants' 
sentences in the same jurisdiction.206 Andrade's sentence of 
fifty years to life is generally exceeded only by a sentence for 
first-degree. murder and a few other violent crimes such as 
train wrecking.207 The court explained that even crimes of 
extreme violence like second-degree murder, rape and sexual 
assault on a minor are given much shorter sentences.208 
Additionally, the court calculated that petty theft without 
a prior record would justify a sentence of up to six months in 
county jail and up to a $1000 fine. 209 Petty theft with one prior 
theft offense could receive up to three years in prison and thus, 
Andrade could have received a maximum of 6 years for his two 
current offenses.21o 
Although the State argued that Andrade's sentence must 
only be compared to other recidivists with prior felony offenses, 
the court explained that such an analysis would beg the 
question of whether these sentences are unconstitutional. 211 
Even if the court were convinced that such an analysis was 
proper, it found Andrade's sentence was twice as long as any 
non-violent recidivist punished under the Three Strikes Law.212 
The court concluded that the intrajurisdictional comparison 
established that Andrade's sentence was significantly longer 
than the sentences for most violent crimes and greatly 
203 ld. at 758·59. 
204 ld. at 759·60. 
205 ld. at 750, 760-6l. 
206 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 761·62. 
207 ld. 
208 ld. 
209 ld. at 76l. 
210 ld. 
211 Andrade, 270 F.3d at 762. 
212 ld. 
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exceeded the sentences of nonviolent recidivists sentenced 
under Three Strikes in California.213 
Next the court performed an interjurisdictional comparison 
between California's Three Strikes Law and recidivist statutes 
in Rhode Island, West Virginia, Texas and Louisiana.214 The 
court chose these states because they were the only four places 
where petty theft with a prior could be a triggering offense for 
sentencing under a recidivist statute.215 The court found that 
"[e]ven in these four states, however, Andrade could not receive 
a sentence nearly as severe as he did under California's Three 
Strikes law on the basis of his two prior strikes for residential 
burglary."216 
Based on this three-part objective factor test, the Ninth 
Circuit decided to "disagree with the California Court of Appeal 
and conclude that Andrade's sentence is so grossly 
disproportionate to his crime that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the Constitution."217 
While this is the first time that any court has held 
California's Three Strikes Law violated the Constitution, it is 
important to remember how narrowly the Ninth Circuit drafted 
this decision. The Three Strikes Law is in no way overturned 
and this opinion may only give hope to a small number of those 
sentenced under the law. Had Andrade's sentence been one life 
sentence it is possible that the Ninth Circuit would have 
upheld it since his sentence would then be closer to other 
defendants and thus, the result of the intrajurisdictional 
analysis would have been different. Still, the holding may 
remind California courts of the seemingly forgotten Romero 
discretion. 
Perhaps such careful analysis that balances the "spirit" of 
Three Strikes and the Eighth Amendment requirements of 
Solem and Harmelin will lead California courts to achieve a 
greater degree of fairness in sentencing. Perhaps this level of 
fairness will remind the public and the legislature that the 
spirit of the Constitution must be protected even in the wake of 
unthinkable tragedy. 
213 [d. 
214 [d. at 762-67. 
215 [d. at 762. 
216 Andrade. 270 F.3d at 765. 
m [d. at 765-66. 
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B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT REVERSES Two MORE THREE STRIKES 
SENTENCES 
In Brown v. Mayle, a decision handed down by the Ninth 
Circuit on February 7, 2002, two more sentences required by 
the Three Strikes Law were reversed as violations of the 
defendants' Eighth Amendment rights.218 The two defendants, 
Earnest Bray, Jr. and Richard Napolean Brown, had both been 
convicted of petty thefts with a prior, had previous felony 
convictions, were given third strikes and were ultimately 
sentenced to twenty-five years to life.219 Bray's final offense 
was attempting to steal three videotapes and Brown's 
triggering offense was attempted theft of a $25 steering wheel 
alarm from a drugstore.220 The two defendants filed habeas 
corpus petitions and were denied.221 Both filed appeals arguing 
that their sentences constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment.222 
Mter the Andrade decision, the Ninth Circuit consolidated 
Bray's and Brown's cases, appointed counsel, as they had 
previously filed pro se motions, and required the parties to 
submit briefing on whether Andrade would affect either 
defendant.223 
Citing its own previous opmIOn, the Ninth Circuit 
proceeded to apply the same in depth analysis employed in 
Andrade to the question of whether these defendants' 
sentences were constitutional. 224 The Andrade analysis led the 
Ninth Circuit to conclude that Bray's and Brown's cases were 
very similar to Andrade's as all three defendants were 
convicted of shoplifting small amounts of inexpensive 
merchandise and had received indeterminate life sentences.225 
There were, however, several differences between the cases 
that the Ninth Circuit addressed within its constitutionality 
analysis. For example, Bray and Brown had each received one 
twenty-five to life sentence while Andrade had received two 
218 Brown v. Mayle, 2002 WL 187415 (9th eir. Feb. 7,2002). 
219 [d. at *1. 
220 [d. at *2 -*3. 
221 [d. at *3. 
222 [d. at *4. 
223 Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *4. 
:m [d. at *4 -*18. 
2211 [d. at *7 -*8. 
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such sentences.226 Although the State argued that this 
dissimilarity resulted in a very different analysis of the gross 
dis proportionality of the sentences to the offenses, the Court 
disagreed.227 The Ninth Circuit explained, "[I]f Andrade's 50-
year-to-life sentence for two petty theft convictions was grossly 
disproportionate, it follows that a 25-year-to-life sentence is 
grossly disproportionate to one petty theft conviction."228 
The Ninth Circuit further explained that the length of 
Bray's or Brown's sentence did not alter the intrajurisdictional 
analysis of Andrade.229 The State argued, as it did in Andrade, 
that since about one hundred other defendants received 
indeterminate life sentences for petty thefts with priors under 
Three Strikes, the interjurisdictional analysis leans in favor of 
upholding Bray's and Brown's sentences.230 The court, 
however, explained that Andrade held that it is impossible to 
argue a statute is constitutional by showing evidence of other 
similar applications of the statute.231 The Ninth Circuit 
graphically analogized that, "[i]f, for example, the state 
decided to chop off the hands of everyone convicted of speeding, 
the likely conclusion that such a sentence is cruel and unusual 
would not change because the state inflicted it on many 
people."232 
In performing the interjurisdictional analysis, the court 
found that the four states used as comparison in Andrade were 
still the only four places where petty theft with a prior could 
constitute a triggering offense for a recidivist statute 
sentence.233 The court concluded that neither defendant would 
have received such a harsh sentence in Rhode Island, Texas or 
West Virginia.234 Additionally, the court commented that 
Louisiana had recently amended its recidivist statute and that 
neither defendant would have received twenty-five years to life 
without the possibility of parole under current Louisiana law 
226 [d. at *8. 
227 [d. 
228 Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *8. 




233 Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *10. 
234 [d. 
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as they did in California.235 The court emphasized that, 
"[r]ecent rejection of a higher sentence by the only state that 
perhaps would have allowed it in narrow circumstances signals 
a considered national legislative judgment based on actual 
experience that California's sentence is indeed disproportionate 
to the crime."236 
The final difference between Andrade, Bray and Brown, 
which the court discussed, was the presence of previous violent 
crimes in both Bray's and Brown's past.237 Bray had three 
previous robbery convictions.238 Brown had been convicted of 
five serious or violent offenses including two counts of second-
degree burglary, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon 
and one count of robbery.239 Both defendants were convicted of 
several other misdemeanor crimes as well.240 The court 
indicated that this difference does not dictate a different 
outcome than the one in Andrade for several reasons.241 
First, the court explained that the "violent" crimes that 
Bray and Brown were convicted of were not considered violent 
at the time of their convictions.242 Second, the court held that 
conviction of previous violent offenses is only significant when 
the current offense is violent as well.243 The court explained 
that when an offender commits a violent crime, and it is 
established that he has committed previous violent offenses, 
his proclivity towards violence justifies sentencing him under a 
severe recidivist statute.244 The court stated that there is no 
similar justification for punishing a nonviolent offender for 
past violent offenses.245 The Ninth Circuit concluded, "[a]fter 
Andrade, for all the reasons already surveyed, an 
indeterminate life sentence for a defendant convicted of felony 
petty theft with a prior who has at least two prior serious 
230 [d. at 12. 
236 [d. at *13. 
237 [d. at *13 -*16. 
238 Brown. 2002 WL 187415. at *2. 
239 [d. at *3. 
240 [d. at *3 -*4. 
241 [d. at *13. 
242 [d. (All forms of robbery were not considered violent crimes until the amendment 
of Cal. Penal Code 667.5(c)(9) in 2000). [d. 
243 Brown. 2002 WL 187415. at *15. 
244 [d. 
245 [d. at *14. 
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felony convictions . . . violates the Eighth Amendment's 
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment."246 
Once again, the court did not overturn Three Strikes and it 
did not find every application of California's recidivist statute 
unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit did hold, however, that 
the application of Three Strikes to defendants whose triggering 
offense is petty theft and the resulting imposition of twenty-
five years to life without the possibility of parole is cruel and 
unusual punishment.247 The California court was thus ordered 
to resentence Bray and Brown in light of this decision.248 
C. PRoPOSALS TO AMEND CALIFORNIA'S THREE STRIKES LAw 
1. Current Trends in the Movement to Revamp the Three 
Strikes Law 
On February 23, 2001, Assemblywoman Jackie Goldberg 
introduced an act to amend California Penal Code Sections 667 
and 1170.12.249 The Goldberg bill seeks to change several 
aspects of the sentencing guidelines under the Three Strikes 
Law.250 Currently the length of time between the prior and 
current felony conviction does not affect the sentence. The bill 
seeks to change this.251 Additionally, it seeks to change the 
prohibition on using diversion programs such as commitment 
to the California Rehabilitation Center.252 The bill "would 
delete the provisions providing that the length of time between 
the prior felony conviction and the current felony conviction 
shall not affect the imposition of the sentence."253 It would 
"make these provisions inapplicable to cases where more than 
10 years have elapsed since the maximum sentence or 
sentences of the previous conviction."254 The bill would also 
"permit commitment to a facility outside of the state and the 
246 Id. at *15. 
247 [d. at *18. 
248 Brown, 2002 WL 187415, at *18. 





254 A.B. 1652 , 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ca. 2001). 
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granting of diversion or commitment to the California 
Rehabilitation Center.255 
Assemblywoman Goldberg made this reform effort a two-
year bill, which means that it will be held over until 2002's 
legislative session as opposed to being voted on in 2001.256 One 
commentator argues that this means that Goldberg did not 
think she would have enough votes to pass the bill this year.257 
The need for votes is severely felt within the Three Strikes 
revision forum because, as a codified initiative, a two-thirds 
majority is needed to make any modification to the existing 
legislation. 258 
Goldberg's bill takes several steps towards a more sensible 
and fairer recidivist statute. By demanding that a defendant's 
prior and current felony be within a limited time span, the 
proposed bill eliminates the focus on individuals who do not 
truly qualify as career criminals. In addition, by providing for 
diversion programs, the bill limits the affect on those 
defendants suffering from drug or alcohol addiction. Even these 
changes, however, do not address the need to amend the Three 
Strikes Law to avoid violations of the Eighth Amendment and 
insure that the law is effectively targeting the crimes it was 
enacted to prevent. 
2. Legislative Proposals 
In addition to the alterations proposed by Assemblywoman 
Goldberg, there are several basic changes to the Three Strikes 
Law that the legislature could make in order to limit the law's 
scope to those crimes which society has the greatest interest in 
preventing.259 First, the legislature should revise the list of 
felonies included within the "violent or serious" definitions.260 
If the Three Strikes initiative was voted for and enacted to 
quell Californians' concern over violent crimes against persons 
then perhaps the statute should address this fear directly 
255 Id. 
256 See Alan Block, 'Three Strikes" Reform: A Small But Determined Group of 
Activists Works to Change the Law, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 29, 2001, at cover. 
257 Id. 
258 Luna, supra note 30 at 9. 
259 See supra notes 170·185 and accompanying text. 
260 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
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without ensnaring lesser offenders under its overreaching list 
of qualifying offenses. 
Specifically, all offenses that are not crimes against 
persons should be excluded from the list. For instance, 
burglary should be excluded unless the homeowner is in the 
house and is either threatened or assaulted by the offender in 
order to commit the crime. This exclusion is extremely 
important especially in California where the Penal Code 
defines burglary as the entrance of any structure with the 
intent to commit a felony therein.261 Under this scheme, a 
person who steals a bike from an attached garage can be 
convicted of burglary and charged with a strike even if he 
never entered the house and no actual violence against a 
person was used in the commission of the crime. 
Moreover, the selling of certain drugs to minors should not 
be considered a strike in all cases. Under the current 
incarnation, an eighteen-year-old who sells his seventeen-year-
old friend heroin will receive a strike, but if the transaction 
went in the opposite direction the Three Strikes Law would not 
be implicated.262 Therefore, the present system seems 
unreasonably arbitrary. 
The most important change, however, that the legislature 
should make to conform the Three Strikes Law to the Eighth 
Amendment pursuant to the Solem and Harmelin mandates is 
to require that all three strikes be given for violent or serious 
felonies only. Nonviolent felonies such as drug possession must 
be expressly excluded from counting as a third strike. 
Currently, any third felony, whether violent or serious will 
result in an indeterminate life sentence.263 Therefore, a third 
281 See CAL. PEN. CODE § 459 (West 2001) providing: 
[d. 
[e]very person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, 
warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel as 
defined in Section 21 of the Harbors and Navigation Code, floating home, as 
defined in subdivision (d) of Section 18075.55 of the Health and Safety Code, 
railroad car, locked or sealed cargo container, whether or not mounted on a 
vehicle, trailer coach, as defined in Section 635 of the Vehicle Code, vehicle as 
defined by the Vehicle Code, when the doors are locked, aircraft as defined by 
Section 21012 of the Public Utilities Code, or mine or any underground portion 
thereof, with intent to commit grand or petit larceny or any felony is guilty of 
burglary. As used in this chapter, 'inhabited' means currently being used for 
dwelling purposes, whether occupied or not. 
262 See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
263 See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
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strike can be charged for theft, drug sales and even drug 
possession. An individual, who has a criminal history and has 
tallied up two strikes, will spend the next twenty-five years of 
his life in prison even if his current offense is possession of 
marijuana. It is easy to see how without strong drug 
rehabilitation programs, job training or employment 
opportunities, California has turned its back on the notion of 
rehabilitating individuals to re-enter society after committing 
an offense. 
Instead, as a community we have decided to allow the 
Three Strikes Law and mass incarceration conceal societal 
problems such as unemployment and drug abuse from our 
sight. Unfortunately, this method does nothing to solve these 
problems, and as stated previously, has not deterred them 
either.264 
Finally, the legislature should amend the Three Strikes 
Law so that prosecutors are precluded from elevating a 
misdemeanor such as petty theft to a felony for the purposes of 
charging a strike as in order to sentence a defendant to an 
indeterminate life sentence.265 Instead of hoping that the 
courts will be able to weigh each case individually and 
determine when an offender falls within the spirit of Three 
Strikes, the law should clearly indicate that its purpose is to 
prevent any further commissions of violent or serious felonies. 
By prohibiting prosecutors from charging individuals with a 
third strike for crimes that are otherwise considered 
misdemeanors the law would more efficiently target those 
individuals who have spent time in prison for violent or serious 
crimes and were not deterred from continuing such anti social 
behavior. 
3. Policy and Judicial Proposals 
While legislative action is most desirable because it would 
clearly indicate when strikes may be charged, such a strong 
legislative action seems unlikely considering the number of 
votes necessary to make a change.266 Additionally, the current 
political climate continues to thrive on a get tough on crime 
264 See supra notes 170-185 and accompanying text. 
265 See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
266 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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approach.267 Therefore, considering current movements to 
reform the Three Strikes Law and the recent Ninth Circuit 
decisions, California courts should reconsider the power of 
judicial discretion and the ability to strike prior felonies in 
certain cases under section 1325(a).268 
Although judicial discretion is understandably a power 
that judges strive not to abuse, trial court judges should be 
given greater latitude to determine whether a defendant falls 
with the 'spirit' of the Three Strikes Law. The concern for a 
degree of uniformity in sentencing, however, has driven many 
to consider the restriction on judges' subjective decision-
making. of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, these 
restrictions have been implemented at the cost of the humanity 
of our criminal justice system. Mter all, we continue to invest 
a great amount of respect in judges and choose those 
individuals to act as the scales of justice. 
While limitations on judicial discretion and sentencing 
guidelines may seemingly result in identical sentencing for 
criminal activity, these laws divest from judges their ability to 
consider all the factors of an individual's background in order 
to determine whether that individual indeed falls within the 
spirit of the Three Strikes Law. Therefore, Andrade and Bray 
should be read and applied broadly enough to include all 
nonviolent offenders who have been sentenced to life in prison. 
Judges should realize the power granted them through Section 
1325(a), Romero, and Andrade, and use that power to limit the 
unfair and unconstitutional effects of the California Three 
Strikes Law. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States has become an extremely violent 
society. The press bombards us with stories of tragedy and 
death due to unfathomable acts by people against innocent 
victims. It makes sense that as a society we have turned to the 
law as an avenue to curb this violence and stem the tide of the 
incomprehensible destruction of life that too often occurs. The 
legal community, however, must attempt to understand the 
267 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
268 See supra notes 49·54, 187·248 and accompanying text. 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss2/3
2002] "SPIRIT" OF THE THREE STRIKES LAW 205 
anger and strong emotions that we feel as a society and deal 
with them rationally by creating legislation that results in a 
decrease of violent crime and not merely legislation that leads 
to mass incarceration of poverty-stricken and drug-addicted 
individuals. There are other solutions to these greater societal 
problems and we need to remember the oldest truism that the 
punishment ought to fit the crime.269 
Rebecca Gross* 
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